Why was AUKUS brought in when there was QUAD ?

 - Are the efforts of the USA known to prevent the prosocial upgrading of ASEAN-China? How does the US want to keep ASEAN balanced? Or is the US focusing more on QUAD and AUKUS?

 

Recent economic growth and dramatic trade in the ASEAN region and the rise of China have created new insecurities in the Asia Pacific. The combination of diplomatic, physical repositioning and rhetorical constructs are designed by powers to suit their strategic interests. Given China's limited control over the passage, any disruption – ranging from piracy to fears of a potential naval blockade by the US lead allies – will create an adverse impact on its long-term food and energy security. Beijing’s flagship development project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is largely an attempt to escape this dilemma, constructing alternative routes west of the Straits by highways, railways, ports, and oil and gas pipelines.

 

The US, Japan, India and Australia (QUAD) proposed the Indo-pacific idea in 2007 to support their agenda of managing geo-strategy and trade. The US wants to maintain hegemony over trans-oceanic trade that it has enjoyed since WWII in the form of US Pacific Command (USPACOM), the Pacific Rim, The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercise and the West Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS). QUAD is an Indo-Pacific construct to represent a comprehensive effort to secure trans-oceanic economic and strategic architecture. ASEAN views this as an extension of US-China rivalry fuelled by rule-based, freedom of navigation and free and open shipping lanes rhetoric embedded in US National Security Strategy document released in December 2017. It was US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s re defining Asia Pacific protecting, “freedom of navigation”, “Free and open access” and “rules-based order” to create an order challenged by China. President Trump had proposed Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP) in 2017. In the policy paper it claims, The U.S. vision for the Indo-Pacific excludes no nation. We do not ask countries to choose between one partner or another. Instead, we ask that they uphold the core principles of the regional order at a time when these principles are under renewed threat. Likewise, the newly minted European Union Indo-Pacific Strategy ratified in April 2021 claims it would support ASEAN members in being autonomous and sovereign. ASEAN is willing to take the support provided it does not move in militarily but give back up support to countries in the region.

It is at this point AUKUS was announced on 15^th September 2021 which again attempts to correct the perceived imbalance of power from Chinese military build-up and assertiveness. This has not gone down well with India from QUAD who also champions the need for a free, open, inclusive, rules-based Indo-Pacific, there are several areas where it can work in enhancing cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and has been exploring potential synergies with sub-regional frameworks, such as, IORA, BIMSTEC, BIMP-EAGA, Mekong sub-regional cooperation frameworks. The U.S.- Australia-India-Japan Quadrilateral Consultations were elevated to the ministerial level in September, a historic first for our countries. The ministers affirmed their commitment to cooperation on maritime security, quality infrastructure, and regional connectivity, and discussed priorities in counter-terrorism and cyber security. The inaugural 2+2 Dialogue in 2018 significantly enhanced our defence and economic cooperation. As a Major Defense Partner, India has purchased more than $16 billion in U.S. defence platforms, with billions more in the pipeline. We signed a bilateral Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement to facilitate defence cooperation in 2018, and plan to hold the first-ever triservice bilateral exercise, Tiger Triumph, in November 2019. The United States and India are working together to address regional and global development challenges.[1]

Concerns about AUKUS stem less from the trilateral deal per se, but more from the attendant fears of a loss of regional stability with the projection of US and allied forces into the region amid intensified Sino-US competition. A case in point was the deployment of US naval forces – including the small carrier USS America – off the coast of Borneo in April 2020. This was in response to a Chinese survey ship, and accompanying coast guard and maritime militia ships, which were shadowing the West Capella, a drillship chartered by Petronas near the outer edge of Malaysia’s EEZ.[2] While the US effort has been noted as a decisive effort to confront China and reassure regional states,[3] it has also been argued that America’s lack of staying power in the area (the warships left after five days) escalated the situation for Malaysia and only served to “make things worse”.[4] In recent years, US freedom of navigation operations to challenge China’s excessive maritime claims in the South China Sea have raised the risk of accidental escalation. Australia’s Defence Strategic Update in 2020 noted that Canberra’s strategic environment had deteriorated more quickly than anticipated since its 2016 defence white paper. While there were few explicit references to China, it was clear that Beijing’s military build-up was the main focus of Canberra’s concerns. The 6.4 per cent increase in China’s defence spending in 2020 (US$9 billion in real terms) is more than the combined real increase in Indo-Pacific regional states in that year.16 China’s economic coercion of Australia—including the imposition of high tariffs on Australian products—after Canberra called for an inquiry into the origins of the coronavirus also played a part in Australia’s decision to strengthen its power projection capabilities. Concerns about arms racing and power projection need to be set in proper perspective. Past US-backed initiatives to deter China—for instance, the Obama administration’s pivot to Asia—incited negative reactions from several ASEAN countries.

The primary purpose of AUKUS is to provide Australia with nuclear-powered submarines, but it also includes a commitment to jointly develop other technologies such as quantum computing, artificial intelligence and other undersea capabilities. According to a joint statement, the deal underscores the three countries’ commitment to deepen diplomatic, security and defence cooperation in the Indo-Pacific so as to meet the “challenges of the twenty-first century”.[5] China warned that AUKUS would “undermine regional peace and stability, aggravate arms race(s) and impair international nuclear non-proliferation effort, [6] and underscore the fact that extra-regional powers are seeking minilateral options outside the multilateral framework led by ASEAN. With regard to non-proliferation, there are clearly concerns about what AUKUS portends for nuclear non-proliferation in terms of setting a precedent for future proliferation by utilising naval reactor programmes to develop nuclear weapons “by the back door”. [7] These concerns are largely misplaced. Although a final decision has yet to be made, the most likely outcome after the 18-month consultation process among the AUKUS members is that Australia will join a UK-led project to design a successor to the Royal Navy’s Astute-class nuclear-powered attack submarines. The British-designed submarines for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) would be constructed in Adelaide, but the nuclear reactors would be built in the UK and installed in Australia as a “black box”. British reactors have a lifespan of around 30 years which means Australia would not have to enrich uranium nor refuel the submarines, thus eliminating the risk of nuclear proliferation. The submarines will be armed with US-made Tomahawk cruise missiles and, probably, US-made torpedoes. Given the limited numbers of both US and UK nuclear-powered submarines, it is unlikely that Australia will lease any from either country, though US nuclear attack submarines could be forward deployed to Australia. Australian submariners would probably train on British submarines. Starting from the mid-2020s, the operational life of the RAN’s current fleet of Collins-class submarines will be extended for 10 years while the nuclear-powered boats are under construction.[8] The plan would be for the RAN to receive its first nuclear-propelled submarine in the late 2030s or early 2040s. Currently, the existing security agreement lack in managing the region or China, like the US, New Zealand and Australia 1951 Agreement, The South Korea Défense Treaty 1953 which allows 28,500 US troops to be stationed in the country and The Japan Defense Treaty 1960.[9]

The picture that emerges is again of US-China rivalry with India, Australia and ASEAN trying to manage the security issue and own interests. Its outcome remains to be seen because several policy documents legal regimes and domestic policies of ASEAN countries are emerging to a problem the region did not encounter before. Will ASEAN be able to devise strong regional mechanisms like legal standards of trade beyond negotiating a Code of Conduct regarding disputes in the South China Sea and define parameters to ASEAN Outlook on Indo Pacific since it's behind close door policy may not be an acceptable way global security concerns. As of now, ASEAN countries have begun spending more on upgrading of army and defence spending and have no choice but to counterbalance the two superpowers. Neither US or China can afford a war but the region will continue to remain unstable until the US is shown it will continue to be power in the region but if it expects more that may not be forthcoming. Furthermore, the Nuclear Free Zone will need to be reiterated at the earliest session of the General assembly. A new mechanism for rules of conduct will need to be devised where EU wants to participate and ASEAN may well consider managing the expectation of both China and US because we can observe discontent in both camps. On the political-security side, while observers tend to overwhelmingly focus on the South China Sea issue, there is in fact a whole series of areas where ASEAN and China already cooperate, particularly in non-traditional security areas like natural disaster response, transnational crime and countering drug trafficking. Over the past few years, Beijing has also been attempting to deepen its ties with ASEAN as a whole as well as with individual Southeast Asian states. ASEAN and China held their first-ever informal defence ministers’ meeting in Beijing, which was viewed as a landmark development. Their cooperation grew greater in anti-terrorism cooperation in terms of intelligence sharing and exercises, given that a number of maritime Southeast Asian states—most notably Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines—have grown increasingly wary of the threat of the Islamic State to their national security. Besides, Beijing would be willing to enhance collaboration between the People Liberation Army’s Southern Theatre Command and the militaries of ASEAN nations in a wide range of fields including border and coastal defence, maritime security and anti-terrorism.

 

ASEAN Public opinion Poll 2021

 

Most Influential Political and Strategic Power in Southeast Asia

 

China continues to be seen as the most influential political-strategic power in the region although its percentage share dipped from 52.2% in 2020 to 49.1% in 2021. China’s political-strategic influence is felt more keenly in mainland Southeast Asia – Laos (65.0%), Cambodia (61.5%), Thailand (58.8%) and Myanmar (51.9%) – than in maritime states. The Philippines continues to be the only country that chooses the US (38.8%) over China (29.9%) as the most influential political-strategic power in the region. The region’s anxiety over Beijing’s growing strategic clout has not eased but increased to 88.6% from 85.4% last year. This anxiety is as pronounced in the mainland as in maritime Southeast Asia with the highest levels found in Vietnam (97.7%), followed by the Philippines (95.0%), Thailand (92.2%), Myanmar (91.4%) and Singapore (87.1%)

Assessing US Engagement in the Region

The majority of respondents expect to see the Biden Administration elevate US engagement with the region. 68.6% of the respondents predict that US engagement will either “increase” or “increase significantly”. 24.5% expect US engagement to “remain unchanged” while a small percentage 6.9% expect the engagement to “decrease” or "decrease significantly". The sense of optimism is most prevalent in Brunei (87.9%), Thailand (78.6%) and Singapore (77.3%). On the other hand, the fear that US engagement will decrease is more pronounced in Vietnam (18.9%) and Laos (10.0%) The difference between the levels of US engagement under the Trump Administration versus the Biden Administration is rather stark. In 2020, 77.0% of Southeast Asians expect levels of engagement with the US to decrease. 68.6% of respondents expect the US to increase engagement under the Biden Administration this year while 6.9% expect a decrease.

Is the US a Reliable Strategic Partner

Despite Washington’s perceived growing absence and decreasing influence in the region, 55.4% of the respondents still express confidence in the US as a strategic partner and provider of regional security. This is a marked increase from last year’s 34.9%, which can be attributed to the general optimism that the new Biden Administration will pivot back to Southeast Asia. At the country-level, the Philippines (77.6%), Singapore (69.0%) and Brunei (60.6%) express greatest confidence whereas Laos (35.0%), Malaysia (33.3%) and Cambodia (30.8%) are least confident. Who will the Region turn to in America’s Absence? If the US is perceived as unreliable, the most preferred strategic partner for Southeast Asia remains Japan (36.9%) with the EU (19.3%) as a distant second choice. China ranks as the third choice at 18.9%. Japan is the top choice for Vietnam (66.7%), the Philippines (54.5%), Myanmar (47.7%), Laos (42.9%), Singapore (41.4%), Cambodia (37.5%) and Thailand (28.9%). The EU is the top choice for Brunei (37.5%), Indonesia (34.4%) and Malaysia (30.8%). Cambodia’s choice is both Japan (37.5%) and the EU (37.5%). China is no country’s top choice this year. Laos picked China as its top choice last year. In this year’s survey, New Zealand and Russia are removed from the list of choices and the United Kingdom (UK) is added. The UK enjoys some confidence from its traditional close partners in the region – Brunei (12.5%), Malaysia (7.7%), Singapore (6.9%) – and Laos (7.1%).[10]

 

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[1] State Department Policy Paper on Free Indo Pacific Region https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf

 

[2] 8 Euan Graham, “U.S. Naval Standoff With China Fails to Reassure Regional Allies”, Foreign Policy, 4 May 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/04/malaysia-south-china-sea-us-navydrillship-standoff/

[3] 9 Blake Herzinger, “Learning in the South China Sea: the U.S. Response to the West Capella Standoff”, War on the Rocks, 18 May 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/05/learning-in-thesouth-china-sea-the-u-s-response-to-the-west-capella-standoff/

 

[4] Graham, “U.S. Naval Standoff With China Fails to Reassure Regional Allies”,

[5] The White House, “Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS”, 15 September 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/15/joint-leadersstatement-on-aukus/

[6] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press Conference on 22 September 2021”, 22 September 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1908814.shtml

[7] 6 James Acton, “Why the AUKUS Submarine Deal is Bad for Nonproliferation—And What to Do About It”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 September 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/09/21/why-aukus-submarine-deal-is-bad-fornonproliferation-and-what-to-do-about-it-pub-85399

 

[8] “Australia Confirms Life-Of-Type Extension For Collins-Class Submarines”, Naval News, 19 September 2021, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/09/australia-confirms-life-of-typeextension-for-collins-class-submarines

 

[9] https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/aukus-puts-spotlight-on-other-pacific-defense-pacts/2373709?fbclid=IwAR2H7HU1bfEOS4XA-fNQ_T8zzPbLwXw3kZfePJ7UJ7xAuoOekJXmj2TW3Ow

 

[10] ISEAS, The State of Southeast Asia 2021 Survey Report