Chinese ASEAN foreign policy of Charm and Coercion

 Where does Beijing see starting points for winning over individual states or even ASEAN as a whole? Which states does Beijing rate as particularly approachable here?

 

 

China has been using a sort of pull and push policy in handing ASEAN countries. It “push” and advance its position on issues at the expense of ASEAN giving the priority of its interest like in the case of South China Sea territorial claims and the ongoing crisis in Myanmar. It gradually “pull” ASEAN countries closer to its orbit closer comprehensive relationship employing both soft diplomacy and agreements like recent Covid vaccine diplomacy and seeking support in managing US influence in the region. This is calibrated effectively with coercion and charm and mutually reinforced making it difficult for states to challenge and to absorb shortcomings and At the same time, every incremental “push” gradually shores up China’s position down the line and alters the status quo in its favour, further convincing ASEAN states that Beijing is on a slow but sure path to regional dominance and that they should give in to the “pull” of its growing might. The push-pull strategy also has the added utility of perpetuating divisions within ASEAN about how to deal with Beijing amidst these twin forces. The basic idea is that with time, an even stronger China will have both changed the status quo to be much more in its favour as well as drastically reduced the leverage of ASEAN states to do anything about it. Put differently, Beijing may well be calculating that its economic heft and military superiority in the region means that ASEAN states will eventually come to accept its regional dominance. though China today is able to pursue its ‘push and pull strategy in Southeast Asia with certain strengths – including its economic clout, diplomatic acumen, and military prowess – at times it has utilized them in ways that have resulted in more losses than gains, with unrealized investments and problematic projects, counterproductive strong-arming of certain governments, and alarming violations of sovereignty and territorial integrity. This strategy appears to be succeeding. Economically, a string of new Chinese regional and subregional initiatives, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the One Belt One Road (OBOR) and the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Initiative, has made it harder for ASEAN states to resist the opportunities Beijing is offering. On the security side, China has been pushing the envelope on new forums, exchanges, and drills with individual countries as well as ASEAN as a bloc, covering areas such as law enforcement, cross-border crimes, counterterrorism, and even maritime security and the South China Sea.[1] And as Li, the Chinese premier, outlined in his speech in Vientiane earlier this month, China is looking to deepen ties with ASEAN in areas like business and people-to-people ties, where it can leverage the presence of overseas Chinese that can further amplify Beijing’s influence. The reality is in fact much more mixed. Even as Beijing’s inroads into Southeast Asia over the past few years have been significant, Southeast Asian states also remember the fuller history of ASEAN-China relations, this legacy of distrust still continues to inform how Southeast Asia views China.

 

The combined pull of China’s growing influence has not only been increasingly felt by its traditional friends in Southeast Asia, like Cambodia, Laos, those trying to counterbalance the influence of Vietnam and failing Myanmar. . For all the focus on the South China Sea question, it is worth recalling that a majority of the ten members of ASEAN are non-claimants who acknowledge the importance of the issue but are reluctant to let it dominate ASEAN-China relations or undermine the regional peace and stability underpinning their economic development.

Cambodia –One of the ASEAN countries closest to China is Cambodia, officially a one-party rule country is often accused of bowing to China. Its economic, military, educational and cultural relations with China are robust. It has deep penetration of BRI projects considering China debt as mildly put “manageable” and downplays the South China Sea issue within ASEAN forums. It likes to calls itself a “neutral and non-aligned” country, but Chinese presence is so overwhelming that, as Kin Phea, Director General of the International Relations Institute of Cambodia says, it not only leads to tension with the US but it even causes “resentments towards the Chinese in Cambodia.”[2] In 2019 it was accused of supporting Chinese companies that appear to be trying to dodge the tariffs imposed by the United States as part of a punishing trade war by redirecting their shipments through Cambodia. Cambodia represents the dilemmas of a small insecure nation with an authoritarian regime in need of the backing of a great power to survive.[3]

Laos-Laos, has strong cultural and historical ties that often sharing of ancient cultural practices and sharing ruling kingdom altering on both sides of the border. The close friendship with Vietnam tested during the China-Vietnam war. Beginning of 1990s, Laos had begun repairing its relations with China and today, those efforts have come to fruition in economic and infrastructure terms. BRI projects are developing fast in Laos, and the two countries are committed to building a “community of shared future”.[4] Laos is another country laden with high Chinese loans and debt. As expected, Laos also underplays the South China Sea dispute within ASEAN.

 

Thailand-Thailand does not consider China as a security threat. Although China’s damage to Mekong affects agriculture, and its negative annual trade balance with China, Thailand’s military and royalist elites view China as a friend of Thai autocracy Thailand’s military junta has been boosting defense ties with Beijing, even agreeing to purchase Chinese submarines,. The Thai government is keen to get China’s assistance in securing 5G technology and AI support for enhancing its surveillance capabilities.[5] To be sure, the United States also supports Thailand’s leadership in the Mekong region—through the Lower Mekong Initiative. The US is a development partner of the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS), which is a partnership of the five lower Mekong countries for coordinating infrastructure development. These are parts of a continuing relationship which neither side wants to disrupt. Yet, a realistic assessment would suggest, as Zachary Abuza of the National War College says, “American and Thai strategic concerns are sharply out of alignment… Thailand is no longer a key partner for advancing U.S. interests in the region, especially vis-à-vis China.”[6]

 

 

Philippines- The US’ relationship with the Philippines, which is historically a close Washington ally but they are yo yoing with China.  The ministers in the Philippines government, as well as the general public, are wary of China’s expansive activities in the South China Sea at the expense of the Philippines’ territorial claims, recently had a new opening with Beijing after years of frosty relations under Benigno Aquino III President Rodrigo Duterte is determined to bring the country closer to China. In early 2020 he terminated a key military pact with the US, the Visiting Forces Agreement, which is the foundation of the long relations between the two countries. Although the cancellation has been suspended, it shows Duterte’s resolve to build not only economic but security relations with China.[7] Duterte’s desire to lower the temperature on the South China Sea question is a sentiment shared by a majority of Southeast Asian states (and even to some extent the Obama administration) following the arbitral tribunal’s ruling on the Philippines’ South China Sea case against China.

Vietnam-South China Sea, has also pushed Southeast Asian countries away to varying degrees and led them to undertake to balance measures in response. The clearest case here is Vietnam, which remains the most forward-leaning ASEAN state on the South China Sea question. Beijing’s decision to deploy a giant oil rig into Hanoi’s waters in May 2014, which led to clashes and protests, has led to what Vietnamese interlocutors still refer to today as a “loss of strategic trust” between the two sides. That, in turn, has seen Vietnam engaging even more with the United States, with the two sides moving closer to bold steps like defence deals with the historic lifting of the US arms embargo earlier this year.  Vietnam fought a war with China in 1979; it has maritime disputes with China as well. Its long and complicated history with China is characterised by distrust and fundamental differences despite ideological and regime similarities. Disputes over Spratly and Paracel islands have proved to be difficult, and both consider the South China Sea as their core interest. Yet Vietnam has to deploy diplomatic skill, and however much it can use the “comradely and brotherly” relations between the Chinese and the Vietnamese communist parties, to manage its relations with the giant neighbour. It has tried to “compartmentalise” the maritime dispute to enter into cooperative relations on other fronts like economy or infrastructure. The 2014 oil rig incident, or China’s rejection of the international tribunal’s ruling on the Philippines’ case on South China Sea, sent alarm bells for Vietnam. Likewise, it has also fought a war with US and won and now re-engaging with t to emerge from the shadows and influence of China. It was one of two countries for Vice President Kamala Harris visit to ASEAN.

Malaysia-Malaysia’s position is arguably weaker than Indonesia’s. Despite China’s regular presence on Malaysia’s maritime economic zone, Malaysia has avoided confrontational posturing. On economic issues too, it has deepened its relations with China and welcomed Huawei’s 5G network but later awarded it to Eriksson. It has chosen to not comment on China’s treatment of the Uighur Muslims. On this the Malaysian political elite is trying to walk the narrow path between meeting domestic public pressure and displeasing China by refusing to send back the Uighur refugees despite the latter’s request. Although defiance was expressed on some BRI projects by the Mahathir Mohamad government, all it did was to renegotiate some of the deals.[8] Much like in Indonesia, China happens to be the largest source of foreign direct investment in Malaysia and the two have sizeable trade between them. Although Malaysia prefers accommodation with China, in December 2019 it submitted a petition with the United Nations “to better delineate its continental shelf claims in the South China Sea.”[9] The Malaysian foreign minister stated his government’s position that Chinese claims on maritime waters in the South China Sea had no legal basis.[10] Malaysia is inclined towards China to draw resources from BRI. It has signed major projects like the East Coast Rail Link and building the twin peak Economic zones in the two countries to collaborate on multiple areas. Post rescheduling of possible to debt from projects by former PM Mahathir, they are on course to greater cooperation and we saw the Foreign minister fly to Bejing on the announcement of AUKUS for consultations for future course of the country.

Indonesia- Indonesia, the largest country in ASEAN and is traditionally considered the “first among equals” within the grouping. Though Jakarta has felt the effects of China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea – from run-ins with Chinese vessels to threats from Beijing to stay silent on the issue – President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo along with several influential cabinet officials have still been reluctant to say “no” to economic overtures from Beijing, since they are key to realizing domestic priorities including infrastructure development. Nonetheless, signals on the security side—from Indonesia’s stepped-up presence in the resource-rich Natuna Islands to the military’s still cool reaction to Beijing’s proposed defense overtures— are pretty clear demonstrations of how Jakarta is resisting Beijing. China investment is to boost Indonesian connectivity and it wants to keep the ports to itself for the Global maritime Fulcrum policy. Indonesia—a country that has strategic partnerships with both the US and China—has come closer to China. This was especially true during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic when China offered Indonesia financial and health-related aid. At the same time, US-Indonesia trade has stagnated over the past several years, hovering around the USD 30-billion mark. Trump’s ‘America First’ policy so damaged the trade relations that a former Indonesian ambassador to the US remarked that the relationship has “lost its soul” during the Trump era.[11] However, tensions remain in the South China Sea. Chinese ships have been found to trespass Indonesian waters, and Chinese coast guard vessels and fishing boats enter Indonesia’s territories. As recently as the end of December 2020 an underwater surveillance drone, found to be of Chinese origin, was caught inside Indonesian sovereign territory. Indonesian politicians expressed their concern, while the military denied knowledge of the drone’s origin. Despite such incidents, the country is moving closer to China and has denied the US facilities for landing maritime surveillance planes on Indonesian territory in the name of “independent foreign policy.” As it has been noted, Indonesia “is worried about US-China rivalry’s potential impacts on regional stability” or ASEAN unity. Ideally, its preference is for “no preponderant power” in the region. Balancing the US and China in the interest of “dynamic equilibrium” in the ASEAN region could be Indonesia’s preferred strategy.[12]

 

Myanmar-Myanmar is shaking up ASEAN with its proximity to China imprisoning democratically elected leaders and repressing media and people. ASEAN tried to intervene and on the 30^th ASEAN -China Summit asked the Chinese to intervene it refused and stated it had too many interests in at stake. Despite the bloodshed of local citizens and human rights violations Chinese government went ahead and signed new deals in gas exploration and more. ASEAN on continuous tried to engage with the Myanmar military government but it failed to welcome its 5-point demand to restore peace and order. After a long meeting, ASEAN decided not to invite Myanmar to the next ASEAN Summit and kept on hold its ratification to RCEP. Myanmar has not been happy with the development and it remains to be seen how it will resume negotiations with ASEAN and keep China happy too.

 

 China has a strong presence in Myanmar in terms of trade, aid and investment, and infrastructure, stepping up the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor as BRI project. Chinese presence is also visible in port, railways and hydropower projects. Myanmar, after all, is a critical pathway for China to access the Bay of Bengal. Myanmar, for its part, needs China’s cooperation in bringing a number of powerful separatist outfits to the negotiating table. However, Myanmar has retained a deep distrust of China across a succession of Myanmar’s regimes. At the same time, it has a troubled relationship with the US as well, which placed Myanmar under a strict sanctions regime for violations of human rights by its military rulers. The relaxation of some sanctions following the partial restoration of democracy in the 2010s is now being re-examined amidst continued human rights violations in” low-grade civil war” with ethnic armed organisations in various parts of Myanmar, and the ‘war crimes committed by its security forces against Rohingya minorities. US assistance has been mostly directed to health, human rights and transparent elections issues in Myanmar. This seriously restricts the possibility of Myanmar approaching the US to hedge against China. The military coup of February 2021 has pushed the Biden administration to impose new sanctions on Myanmar, limiting the room for manoeuvre for the new regime.

 

Singapore- Singapore’s leaders and diplomats have unsurprisingly resisted, playing an important behind-the-scenes role in preserving ASEAN unity on the South China Sea dispute in spite of Chinese attempts to divide the grouping and even publicly trashing claims in Chinese state media about the city-state’s stance towards Beijing. If anything, such Chinese pressure has only reinforced Singapore’s uncertainty about Beijing’s rise, which has factored into the city-state’s decision to strengthen its strategic partnership with the United States. Singapore, of all the Southeast Asian countries, more explicitly tries to navigate between the US and China. For Singapore, the US is a “resident power with vital interests in the region”, while China “is a reality on the doorstep.” Singapore, in the words of its Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, “does not want to choose sides between the US and China.” He resents US withdrawal from TPP just as he wants bipartisan understanding in the US on China policy. Above all, as a BRI participant and as a country with huge investments in China, Singapore desires stability in US-China relations.[13] While as a small nation it is sensitive about its security, it also wants to retain its status as an independent voice in the region, even advising Beijing on how to acquire greater legitimacy by producing more public goods globally.[14] It is Pro US and has good relations with AUKUS and supported it as a counterbalance to Chinese aggression in the region. Singapore relationship with China is mainly commercial and does not extend to security.

 

 

Brunei-China’s relationship with Brunei is less problematic than those with the other ASEAN countries. Brunei gets the sort of investment it needs from China, like in infrastructure, oil refinery, telecommunications and aquaculture. Brunei is also a member of the AIIB. Most importantly, Brunei is the only ASEAN country that has reached a consensus with China on how to address the areas of the South China Sea that both countries dispute.[15]

 

The US-China trade war has heightened the sense of uncertainty in Southeast Asia. 56.3% of the respondents are concerned that the “threat of “decoupling” will divide Southeast Asia into two exclusive blocs led by China and the US. 53.6% fear that “the US and/or China will ask my country to choose between them, but it is not our interest to do so”. Interestingly, and perhaps due to the disruptions brought on by the pandemic, 40.4% think that the trade war is good for Southeast Asia because of the relocation of supply chains and investments to this region. 59.4% of Vietnamese respondents share this view as the country is widely considered the biggest beneficiary from the relocation of manufacturing bases from China. However, Vietnamese respondents (58.3%) are equally concerned over the bifurcation of Southeast Asia as a result of US China “decoupling” Majority of respondents (61.2%) think that the trade war’s intensity will ease but US-China relations are expected to continue to be rocky. 17.0% expect the US to tone down its aggressive stance towards China, possibly due to the change of leadership in the US whereas only 3.2% think that China will meet US demands and conditions. Very few (6.7%) harbour hope that US-China trade relations will return to the pre-trade war status.[16] In view of the ensuing geopolitical and geostrategic shifts in the Indian Ocean region and great-power competition that is likely to ensure around China’s BRI and maritime claims on the one hand, and US-led ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ on the other, ASEAN member-states felt compelled to reiterate their given positions by adopting the ‘ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific’ in June 2019. The statement insists that ASEAN does not want to surrender its ‘central role’ in the region; rather than being swallowed up by either of them in the strategic environment, it would pursue the course of an ‘honest broker between the ‘competing interests. Thus, whatever be their bilateral relations with either of the competing powers, ASEAN as an entity will uphold ‘rules-based regional architecture and work for ‘cooperation’, ‘peace, stability and prosperity.[17]

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[1] Pashanth Parameswaran, “Beware the Illusion of China-ASEAN South China Sea Breakthroughs,” The Diplomat, August 17, 2016.

[2] Kin Phea, “Cambodia China Relations in the New Decade,” Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Foundation Office Cambodia, 26 May 2020.

[3] Sovinda Po and Christopher B. Primiano, “An “Íronclad” Friend: Explaining Cambodia’s Bandowagoning,” in Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs. 14 February 2020.

[4] https://www.orfonline.org/research/china-relationship-asean-explainer/

[5]  Suwatchai Songwanich, CEO, Bangkok Bank (China), “Huawai’s role in Thailand’s 5g development”.

[6] Zachary Abuza, “America should be realistic about its alliance with Thailand,” 2 January 2020.accessed 30 Dec 2020. Also,US Department of State, “US Relations with Thailand,” May 2020.

[7] Joshua Karlantzick, “Is Duterte Trying to End US-Philippines Alliance?” World Politics Review, 21 Feb 2020. accessed 31 Dec 2020; Ankit Panda, “In Sudden Step, Philippines Reverses Course on Ending U S Visiting Forces Agreement—For Now,” The Diplomat, June 04, 2020. Also, US Department of State, “US Relations with the Philippines,”; Aaron jed Rabena and Elliot Silverberg, “Is the US-Philippines Alliance Obsolete?” The Diplomat, 22 April 2020.

[8] Zachary Abuza, “Malaysia: Navigating between the United States and China,” Asia Policy (The National Bureau of Asian Research), 29 April 2020.

[9] Felix K Chang, “A Faint Breeze of Change: Malaysia’s Relations with China,” 08 Jan 2020. Foreign Policy Research Institute. See also, US Department of State, “US Relations with Malaysia,” 21 Jan 2020.

[10] “Malaysia issues rare rebuke on China’s maritime claim over South China Sea“, Business Standard. Also, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_mys_12_12_2019.html.

[11] M. Z. Rakhmat, “Growing toes between Indonesia and China may hurt US Indonesia relationship.” The Conversation, 26 Oct 2020.

[12] Natasha Hamilton-Hurt and Dave Mcrae, “Indonesia: Balancing the United States and China, aiming for independence.” The United States Studies Centre, University of Sydney, November 2015, p. 4 and 18.

[13] Ashley Young, “Singapore’s Fears about US-China Relations and Three Wishes,” Providence, 28 Aug 2020; David A. Wemer, “Singapore’s prime minister has a message for the US: Don’t choose China Confrontation or Asia withdrawal,” Atlantic Council, 28 July 2020; William Choong, “China-US Relations: Singapore’s elusive sweet spot,” ISEAS Perspective 23 July 2020.

[14] KokXinghui, “Singapore’s Lee urges China to ‘ecalibrate’ for global good,” South China Morning Post. 29 January 2021.

[15] Stephen C. Bruce and Abdul Hai Juley, “The Road to Brunei’s Economic Deversifiction: Contemporary Brunei-China Relations,” in China and South East Asia in the Xi Jinping Era (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2019), 139-52.

[16] ISEAS, The State of Southeast Asia 2021 Survey Report

[17] “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.” (Bangkok: Senior Official Meeting, 20-23 June, 2019