ASEAN Positioning in China-US Rivalry
How do the ASEAN member states position themselves in the conflict between USA and China? How do they try to use the mixed situation for their own interests?
The position
of ASEAN in a conflict between the two superpowers needs to be understood from a socio-historical and political perspective. For Western powers, there is a Eurocentric
approach in interpreting situations in the universal conception of the Westphalian
nation-state, international law and universal standards while viewing non-western
practises as something inferior and needing to conform to their norms to be
acceptable. Much of geopolitics today is viewed and analysed as the extension
of this view. In contrast, ASEAN regionalism is conceptualised from a decolonisation and nation-building perspective. It largely depends on old
treaties like FDPA 1971 a 50-year Défense agreement with the bilateral relationship
of cooperation between Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore and UK to consult
each other immediately in the case of threat or an armed attack on any of the five
and decide on measures to take jointly or separately. Another is the Southeast Asia
Treaty 1954 between US,
Australia, France, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, and the UK whereby each
party "recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty
area against any of the parties would endanger its own peace and safety and
each will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its
constitutional processes."
ASEAN
emphasised regional integration and strategies for economic, political
integration towards confidence-building of a regional identity with the intention
to resist great power intervention and to be free of past colonialism and imperialism.
ASEAN has been more united on economic issues less on security especially nuclear
concerns that were taken care of in the 36th ASEAN Summit on 26th
June 2020 in which the members committed to keeping the region free of Nuclear and
other weapons under the Southeast Asian nuclear weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) treaty.
This was reiterated in the 53rd ASEAN Foreign Ministerial meeting on
9th September 2020 reviewing the treaty till 2022. The Action Plan
took note of activities to keep the region nuclear safety and security as well
as radiation and disaster response. The meeting reached a consensus on the
measures taken contributing to global disarmament and non-proliferation.[1]Likewise, under the Joint Declaration on ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and
Prosperity 2016-2020, China agreed to the protocol on keeping the region
nuclear-free and committed to supporting ASEAN efforts to preserve the SEANFWZ
Treaty. And its action plan. ASEAN has the effort to keep the region free of
nuclear and other weapons from 1971The notion of a Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ)
dates back to 27 November 1971, when the original five members of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Kuala Lumpur signed a Declaration on Zone of Peace, Freedom,
and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) that established the SEANWFZ treaty ratified by all
members in 1995. It covers the territories, continental shelves and EEZ of the state’s
parties in the zone. The protocol is open for signatories by China, France,
Russia, UK and US (Group of 5) who undertake to respect the treaty and not to
contribute to any act that could constitute a violation of the treaty and protocol
by state parties. Besides, they also aide not to threaten to use nuclear weapons
against any state party to the treaty and not to use or threaten to use nuclear
weapons with SEANWFZ. The treaty has two elements that go beyond other existing
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) agreements: 1) the zone of application also
includes the continental shelves and EEZ of the contracting parties, and 2) the
negative security assurance implies a commitment by the NWS not to use nuclear
weapons against any contracting State or protocol Party within the zone of
application. The group of 5 have not signed the treaty because of the second
clause and EEZ which restricts them from their use of nuclear weapons within
the zone and within the zone against targets outside the zone, restricting the passage of a nuclear ship through the zone including high seas as per UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) because they claim South China sea is not clearly defined; creating uncertainty on the scope of the treaty. The Fourth Conference of nuclear weapon Free
Zone and Mongolia was planned for 2020 but rescheduled to July 2021 in the 75th
General Assembly session which has further pushed it to the next session to
discuss the situation in the region with the announcement of AUKUS.[2]
ASEAN in 2019 adopted the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific in response
to growing foreign powers interest in the region. President
Trump had proposed the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP) in 2017. It
was drafted by Indonesia and proposed a distinct approach not to align with
either US or China as the efforts to quell their rivalry have failed. ASEAN focused
on taking full advantage of the strategic location as the heart of Indo-Pacific
and to prevent members from taking sides in the economic tug of war when so far
the rivalry has not affected the region’s economy. The document finally outlines the
organization’s concept and strategy of the Indo-Pacific, in which the
Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions have been regarded as the most
dynamic expanse and centre of economic growth. The centrality of the ASEAN has
been emphasized amidst the geopolitical shifts that this region is encountering
like the ongoing tussle between the US and China. By ASEAN Centrality, the
‘Outlook’ denotes that the grouping wants to maintain its central role in the
evolving regional architecture in Southeast Asia and its surrounding regions.
The aim is not to create new mechanisms or replace existing ones; rather, it
is an ‘Outlook’ intended to enhance ASEAN’s Community building process and to
strengthen and give new momentum for existing ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the
East Asia Summit (EAS), as platforms for dialogue and implementation of the
Indo–Pacific cooperation. Besides this, the document impinges upon a
rules-based order anchored upon international law, openness, transparency, inclusivity
and commitment to advancing economic engagement in the region. In this regard, four areas of cooperation- maritime cooperation; connectivity; UN Sustainable
Development Goals 2030; and economic development have been put forward for
engaging with other countries in the Indo-Pacific. The
document does not also provide some measures by which the ASEAN will be able to
navigate these strategic challenges. Though it has been pointed out in the key
elements or principles of the Indo-Pacific outlook that a rules-based order
should be maintained and the Indo-Pacific region should be looking at achieving
“dialogue and cooperation instead of rivalry”, but unlike the policy papers and
the strategic documents of other countries like US, Australia and also Japan
where the threats and challenges have been clearly outlined, the ASEAN document
chose to take the safer or the diplomatic route. The document does lay
out areas of cooperation to engage with other like-minded players in the
region. Given that India also champions the need for a free, open, inclusive,
rules-based Indo-Pacific, there are several areas where it can work in enhancing
cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. There has been mention of exploring potential
synergies with sub-regional frameworks, such as IORA, BIMSTEC, BIMP-EAGA,
Mekong sub-regional cooperation frameworks. The increasing integration and
interconnection among the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean countries require
investments and efforts to build connectivity infrastructures, including
physical, institutional and people-to-people linkages. PM Modi’s Sagarmala
project, the Trilateral Highway and its extension to CLV (Cambodia, Laos,
Vietnam), PM Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Asia-Africa Growth
Corridor (AAGC) can complement and support the existing Master Plan on ASEAN
Connectivity (MPAC) 2025.
ASEAN Response
The response of
ASEAN on security issues in the region has been a tough one, to balance the two
superpowers and perhaps move towards a neutral party European Union which
clearly stated in Indo Pacific strategy on security to support ASEAN countries
to retain their autonomy and sovereignty. China has already sent warnings and over
50 air force planes close to Taiwan and Japan coming in with support while and North
Korea took advantage to test its missiles. It will certainly propel the Code of
Conduct in Maritime under ASEAN- China Summit dialogue and may push for a new
understanding putting security above economic ties to which China would be more
than willing to offer as it would consolidate its regional power structure and
protect BRI trade routes and upcoming trade agreements RCEP. Malaysia has invited
China into CTPP and China has announced to speed up its entry covering the
pacific end to end geographically giving it an excuse to protect its trade routes if
a conflict does emerge.
Malaysia
Malaysia was one of
the first countries to send a signal when the opposition prompted the
government to give a statement on the new Pact. Malaysian Foreign Minister called it residential uneasiness, and
wish to maintain peace in the region.[3]
The opposition in Malaysia urged the Défense and Foreign Ministers in
parliament to give a statement to protect Malaysia’s best interests. “Malaysia
being at the geographical centre of this increasing geopolitical competition
must deliberate and state clearly a position.[4]
Former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad also weighed into the debate, warning
that AUKUS increased the risk of Great Power conflict in Southeast Asia.[5]
However when the Malaysian Défense Minister announced a working visit to China he
was criticised locally and an analyst told Bernama News, an RFA-affiliated
online news service, that Malaysia consulting China on the alliance was
“inappropriate.” “We need to get the views of the leadership, particularly
China’s defence, on what they think of AUKUS and what their action could be,” Défense
Minister Hishammuddin Hussein said. [6]
The plan came after the country voiced serious concerns over the nuclear vessel
pact that "has the potential to disrupt security and stability in
Southeast Asia," In a phone call with Australian Prime Minister Scott
Morrison, and reiterated in a statement released the next day, Malaysian Prime
Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob expressed concern that the new security
arrangements could be a catalyst for a nuclear arms race in the region and
might provoke some countries to act aggressively, especially in the South China
Sea. In raising these concerns, he stressed Malaysia’s commitment to Southeast
Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and the Southeast Asia
nuclear weapons Free Zone (SEANFWZ), as well as Malaysia’s stance on not
allowing nuclear-powered vessels to enter its territorial waters.[7]
Indonesia
Indonesia, another key ASEAN member, was "deeply
concerned over the continuing arms race and power projection in the
region." It should be
noted though that Indonesia’s fears about “the continuing arms race and power
projection” (italics added) – refer not only to the three AUKUS partners but
all regional states, including China. In a statement on 17 September 2021,
Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry said it “cautiously” took note of AUKUS, and
stressed that Jakarta was “deeply concerned” over the “continuing arms race and
power projection in the region”. Indonesia called on Australia to continue
meeting its nuclear non-proliferation obligations and called on Canberra to
maintain its commitment towards regional peace and security in accordance with
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) to which Australia
is also a High Contracting Party.[8]
Senior Indonesian diplomat Abdul Kadir Jailani in an article published in
Jakarta Post echoed his government’s assessment but noted that no
international norm appeared to have been violated. He added that “deeper
conversations” about AUKUS would help build mutual trust, confidence and
diplomacy.[9]
It should be noted that Indonesia’s fears about such developments – worded as
“the continuing arms race and power projection” (italics added) – refers not
only to the three AUKUS partners but all regional states, including China. In
addition, to argue that AUKUS would precipitate an arms race is an inversion of
cause-effect logic. It is clear that AUKUS is a direct result of China’s
“increasingly provocative actions”.[10]
So, Indonesia’s response is less negative than originally perceived and rather
recognises the US balancing China in the region on earlier occasions too.
Observers said the two major
countries' attitudes represent the stance of most regional countries, who are
concerned about risks of nuclear proliferation, regional militarization and
falling victim to major power competition.
Philippines
The Philippines, whose domestic politics is contentious, is
the only country in the region that backs AUKUS, as its Secretary of Foreign
Affairs Teodoro Locsin said in a statement on Tuesday that "the
enhancement of a near-abroad ally's ability to project power should restore and
keep the balance rather than destabilize it."[11] Foreign Minister Teddy Locsin released an
erudite statement which welcomed the establishment of AUKUS and made three key
points. [12]First, ASEAN members,
singly and collectively, lack the military capabilities to ensure peace and
security in Southeast Asia. Second, with the region’s main balancer, the US,
geographically distant, the strengthening of Australia’s power projection
capabilities would help maintain the regional balance of power and enable
Canberra to better respond to threats facing the region. Third, as Australia is
not seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, AUKUS does not violate SEANFWZ nor
Canberra’s commitments to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) or ASEAN centrality. Lorenzana’s and Locsin’s support for AUKUS
reflects the Philippine national-security establishment’s support for the US
alliance system and growing concerns about China’s assertive policy in the
South China Sea. The responses from the Philippines brought into sharp relief
serious divisions within the administration of President Rodrigo Duterte over
national security issues. Since Duterte took office in 2016, US-Philippine
relations have been under strain due to his pledge to “divorce” America and
seek closer relations with China and Russia. This has resulted in the scaling
back of some bilateral defence engagements Duterte’s threat to terminate the
1999 Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)— a threat that was only withdrawn in July
during a visit to Manila by US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.[13]
This is in line with the bilateral treaty it signed with US
in 1951 in which the two recognised an armed attack on the Pacific or either of
the two parties would be dangerous to its own security and safety and agreed
they will meet the common danger in accordance to their constitutional processes.
Another agreement is the Visiting Forces Agreement ratified in 1999 and renewed
with much delay by President Duterte government exempting US military personnel
from passport and visa regulations in the country. Herman Tiu Laurel, a columnist of the
Filipino newspaper Pwersa, told the Global Times that a nuclear submarine is fuelled
with "enriched uranium" which can quickly be converted to weapons
use. That constitutes a violation of the ASEAN Zone of Peace, Freedom and
Neutrality (ZOOPFAN) signed in 1971 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). The Philippines, whose domestic politics is contentious, is the only
country in the region that backs AUKUS, as its Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Teodoro Locsin said in a statement on Tuesday that "the enhancement of a
near abroad ally's ability to project power should restore and keep the balance
rather than destabilize it."[14]
Singapore
Singapore reflects the country’s support
for the deployment of US military forces in the region. Prime Minister Lee Hsien
Loong after a briefing from his Australian counterpart, noted the long-standing
relations between Singapore and Australia. He expressed hope that AUKUS would
contribute constructively to the peace and stability of the region as well as
complement the regional architecture and subsequently, Foreign Minister Vivian
Balakhrishnan expressed the same sentiments stating the long-standing
relationships with all three AUKUS members, and that such “large reservoirs of
trust and alignment” were “very helpful”.[15]
The key point was that AUKUS was “part of a larger geostrategic realignment”;
Singapore had to take it in its stride and make sure it did not end up in an
“unviable or dangerous” position.[16]
From a wider perspective, AUKUS was not really the “centrepiece of concern”,
and the bigger question was the management of US China relations.[17]This
meant that Singapore was not “unduly anxious” about the new developments.[18]
Singapore has always played the role in facilitating a balance of power where
no major power dominates; it also seeks to involve major powers, in particular
the US, in its security. Set in this context, AUKUS, in the face of growing
Chinese military power and assertiveness, would serve as another plank in
maintaining and restoring the regional balance of power.
Vietnam
Vietnam has a broad big-picture approach
in appraising regional realities. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson noted
that all countries should work towards the same goals of peace, stability,
cooperation and development in the region. The spokesperson stressed that the
nuclear energy used for Australia’s new submarine fleet must be used for
peaceful purposes, serve socio-economic development, and ensure safety for
humans and the environment.[19]
Vietnam’s reaction is not unexpected. Hanoi’s long-running dispute with China
in the South China Sea has led it to pursue stronger relations with the US, as
well as other Quad countries. While Hanoi has not expressed open and public
support for the FOIP strategy that is shared by QUAD countries and instead
supported its principles such as maintaining freedom of navigation and
resolving disputes peacefully according to international law. It has also made
effort to build defence relations with QUAD members individually signing with
Japan for the transfer of defence equipment and technology. As a former
Vietnamese ambassador put it, US-led groupings such as the Quad are playing an
“important role” in countering China’s assertiveness. AUKUS, he added, should
bring “new confidence” to countries contesting China’s excessive maritime
claims.[20]
Thailand
Thailand wants to preserve cordial ties
with both parties and does not wish to take a position on the trilateral
arrangement and risk offending either party and gave no official response. The
closest mention was, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-Cha delivered a pre-recorded
speech at the United Nations in which he pledged Thailand’s support for the
Treaty on the Prohibition of nuclear weapons (of which Australia is not a signatory)
and the NPT.[21] His references to these
two treaties could be a sign that Thailand has reservations about AUKUS. Former
Thai foreign minister Kasit Piromya stated that no country wanted to be
dominated by China and that therefore the US military presence is necessary,
and presumably by extension, those of its allies and partners.[22]Thai
observers who offered contrasting views on this matter. Journalist Kavi
Chongkittavorn has accused the three countries of fuelling an arms race in the
Indo-Pacific, provoking tensions with China and forcing regional states to
choose sides in the escalating US-China competition.[23]
AUKUS
reflects ASEAN’s lack of ability to cope with China’s increasing assertiveness
in the maritime domain, particularly in the South China Sea. ASEAN’s concept of
inclusive and cooperative security has proved to be inadequate; like the Quad,
AUKUS as a balance-of-power entrenchment is a “natural response” to coping with
China’s maritime expansionism in the region. The establishment of the EAS in
2011 and the ADMM-Plus in 2010 led to optimism that the region’s security architecture
would reduce the risks of flare-ups. As Nguyen Hung Son, the vice-president of
the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, has noted, ASEAN needs to question why AUKUS
has happened without its knowledge; one has to ask whether the “centrality”
that ASEAN and its partners talk about is “merely lip service”.[24]
[1] https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/southeast-asian-nuclear-weapon-free-zone-seanwfz-treaty-bangkok-treaty/
[3] https://www.malaysianow.com/news/2021/09/18/uneasiness-in-malaysia-not-ruled-out-as-australia-gets-nuclear-subs/
[5] Hadi Azmi, “Aukus fallout:
Malaysia plans China consultations as anxiety simmers over defence pact”, South
China Morning Post, 22 September 2021, https://www.scmp.com/weekasia/economics/article/3149713/malaysia-plans-china-consultations-anxiety-simmers-over-aukus
[7] Ravil Shirodkar,“Malaysia
Says AUKUS Alliance May Lead to Arms Race, Provocation”, Bloomberg, 18
September 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-18/malaysia-saysaukus-alliance-may-lead-to-arms-race-provocation
[8] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Indonesia, “Statement on Australia’s Nuclearpowered Submarines Program”, 17
September 2021, https://kemlu.go.id/portal/en/read/2937/siaran_pers/statement-on-australias-nuclear-poweredsubmarines-program
[9] Ristian Atriandi
Supriyanto, “Why Southeast Asia Should Welcome AUKUS”, Foreign Policy 28
September 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/28/southeast-asia-asean-australia-aukuschina-united-states/
[10] 4 Charles Edel, “China Has
Only Itself to Blame for AUKUS”, Foreign Policy, 24 September 2021,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/24/china-aukus-submarines-defense/ 15
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021
(Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS), p. 226
[12] “Statement of Foreign
Affairs Teodoro L. Locsin, Jr. On the Australia-United Kingdom-United States
(AUKUS) Enhanced Trilateral Security Partnership”, 19 September, https://dfa.gov.ph/dfanews/statements-and-advisoriesupdate/29484-statement-of-foreign-affairs-teodoro-l-locsin-jr-onthe-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-aukus-enhanced-trilateral-security-partnership
[13] Ian Storey, “After Seventy
Years, It’s Time to Modernise the US-Philippines Alliance”, Fulcrum, 23
September 2021, https://fulcrum.sg/after-70-years-its-time-to-modernise-the-usphilippines-alliance/
[14] https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3150023/china-seeks-support-southeast-asia-after-us-britain-and
[15] 4 Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (Singapore), “Transcript of Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr Vivian
Balakrishnan’s Doorstop with Singapore Media via Zoom at the 76th Session of
the United Nations General Assembly”, 25 September 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-StatementsTranscripts-and-Photos/2021/09/20210926-76th-UNGA-doorstop
[16] ibid
[17] ibid
[18] ibid
[19] 9 Tu Anh, “Vietnam Spells
Out Stance on AUKUS”, Hanoi Times, 23 September 2021, https://hanoitimes.vn/vietnam-spells-out-stance-on-aukus-318802.html
[20] 1 Radio Free Asia, “Southeast
Asian Nations Cautious Over New AUKUS Defense Pact”, Radio Free Asia, 17
September 2021, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/aukus-southeastasia09172021164007.html
[21] “Prime Minister Delivered
Statement at the General Debate of the 76th Session of the United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA76)”, 25 September 2021, https://www.mfa.go.th/en/content/pmunga76-2?cate=5d5bcb4e15e39c306000683e
[22] “Philippines Throws Support
Behind AUKUS Pact”, Radio Free Asia, 21 September 2021, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/pact-09212021152655.html
[23] 3 Kavi Chongkittavorn, “
Thai view on the new AUKUS alliance”, Thai PBS World, 27 September 2021,
https://www.thaipbsworld.com/op-ed-thai-view-on-the-new-aukus-alliance/
[24] Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (Livestream),
“AUKUS: Responses from Southeast Asia”, 1 October 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nDpeZcsPoCQ&t=2140s
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